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Abstract 
Two Sides of the Same Coin: Panpsychism as a Solution to the Mind-Body Problem 
By Andrew Coyle 
Mentored by Dr. Steve Parchment 
Department of History, Philosophy, and Religious Studies  
 
Abstract: The Mind-Body problem in philosophy has haunted philosophers for years. It 
asks, “what is the relationship between the mind and the body in a human being?” Is the 
mind something distinct from the body? Or is it nothing more than matter within the 
brain? Various theories have been proposed over the years as attempts to answer these 
pivotal questions. This paper provides a history of the mind-body problem, along with an 
analysis of many of the theories that have been proposed to answer the problem. After 
reviewing dualism, materialism, and panpsychism as theories of mind, I defend 
panpsychism as the best solution to the mind-body problem. I find that panpsychism 
avoids many of the issues that dualism and materialism must explain. Further, it provides 
a more coherent account of the universe. I provide some potential criticisms of 
panpsychism. However, I find that these criticisms can be answered more easily than the 
criticisms of dualism and materialism. For these reasons, I conclude that panpsychism is 
the best solution to the mind-body problem.  
Keywords and Phrases: Mind-body problem, panpsychism, dualism, materialism, 
Descartes, Spinoza, identity theory, functionalism, honors thesis, honors 
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Introduction 
 On an otherwise calm and sleepy night, you awake to a sharp pain in your leg. 
This pain is severe: not only is it irritating your leg, but it is bad enough to where it is all 
you can seem to focus on. As you lay in bed, you try to explain how your leg feels this 
way. It did not hurt when you went to bed. Perhaps you were laying on it just the wrong 
way. You still have a few hours before you have to get ready for work. You would like to 
get some more sleep beforehand so that you can be well-rested for the day ahead. 
However, the pain in your leg is making this impossible: your mind cannot calm down 
due to the pain. If you want to sleep more, you realize that something must be done to 
alleviate the pain.  
 Wincingly, you decide to get out of bed. You initially try to stretch your leg 
muscles. This does not seem to help, as the pain persists even after stretching. Your mind 
remains obsessed on relieving the pain. You walk to your medicine cabinet. You open the 
cabinet, and inside is a container of Ibuprofen. You open the bottle and take some of the 
pain reliever. After a few minutes, the pain in your leg begins to subside. Simultaneously, 
your mind begins to calm down. The pain reliever has worked; you can finally go back to 
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bed with both an eased leg and a clearer mind. Hours later, you awake refreshed and 
ready to start your day.  
 While such occurrences of nightly pain are (hopefully) rare for you, it is an 
important example that is not far from reality. I use such an example to illustrate an 
important aspect of being human: the distinction between the mind and the body. The 
Ibuprofen in this situation did do its advertised purpose: to relieve the pain that you were 
experiencing. As the pain seems to be a mental phenomenon, it must have affected your 
mind in some way or another. Prior to taking the pain reliever, you were in distress, 
searching for a way to help your leg. The pain was all that your mind could focus on. 
After taking the reliever, your mental states changed to ones that were calmer and more 
conducive to sleeping.  
 What do these changes suggest? Perhaps the pain you were experiencing was 
some sort of muscle cramp in your leg. This would be at the physical level. The medicine 
relaxed the cramp in your leg muscle. The medicine thus has an effect on the physical 
level. However, another effect can be observed: the physical change seems to have 
affected your mental states. Initially, you were in a state of distress due to the pain. After 
the pain reliever set in, your mental states calmed, and you no longer experienced pain. 
Thus, we are left with an interesting, if not problematic, observation: we have changes 
both to the muscle and to your mental states from one event. There were changes in both 
your “mind” and your “body.”  
 Initial qualitative evidence would suggest that what we call the “mind” is distinct 
from what we call the “body.” Your body consists of physical “stuff” such as cells, 
organs, etc. The physical body is subject to the laws of nature and is “open” to 
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observation from other beings. In contrast, your mind does not seem like it is composed 
of this physical stuff; rather, it seems that it consists of something “different” due to its 
distinct nature. The mind does not appear to be “open” to objective observation. Part of 
being human thus seems to be consisting of both a mind and a body.  
 This distinction gives a distinct reality to both the mind and the body. Since the 
body is “open” to observation from other beings, its reality is grounded in the physical 
realm. In contrast, the mind is not “open” to such observation by other beings: only the 
being possessing the mind can view its contents. The mind does not seem to follow the 
same physical laws as the body (e.g. the mind doesn’t seem to have a physical mass). 
With these differing qualities, mind and body appear to be completely different things. 
Despite this, humans can still be said to have both a mind and a body.  
 If humans consist of both a mind and a body, then there must be some way in 
which both interact with one another. It is difficult to suppose that they share no 
connection to one another: if this were the case, how would the pain reliever cause 
changes to both your leg and your mental states? The reliever may not necessarily have a 
direct effect on your mind; the physical changes in your body from the medicine may 
cause changes in your mind. The point here is that there must be some account as to what 
the “mind” and “body” of a human are, along with how each would interact with one 
another.  
 When we try to give such an account, we find that we stumble upon one of the 
most famous (or infamous depending on your view) problems in the history of 
philosophy. This is the mind-body problem. McLaughlin defines it as “the problem of 
whether mental phenomena are physical and, if not, how they are related to physical 
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phenomena” (684). The mind-body problem thus asks a couple of key questions. For one, 
what is the ontological status of the mind? Is it simply another way to talk about physical 
entities such as brains? Does it “emerge” from the brain as something above physical 
states? Or is it something that is truly distinct and separate from the physical, but still 
able to interact with the physical? Another question the mind-body problem raises is if 
the mind is truly something different from physical entities, how does it interact with the 
body and the brain? At what point in space does this interaction occur? Thus, we can see 
that the mind-body problem is indeed a problem, as it leaves us with many questions that 
need an answer.  
 At this point, one may respond to the Mind-Body Problem with the simple, yet 
effective “So What?” Why should we care whether the mind is physical or something 
else? Should we really care what our mind consists of? Perhaps the problem will seem 
more important and practical to the average reader once we elaborate on what is at stake 
in trying to understand what the mind is. As humans, we not only seem to have a mind, 
but seem to have a sort-of inner “consciousness” that can experience and further reflect 
on those experiences. Since antiquity, humans have tried to account for how mind and 
consciousness could emerge from a universe that seemingly consists of nothing more 
than physical “stuff.” In more recent years, scientists have shifted to studying the brain as 
the potential source of consciousness (Dennett and Kinsbourne 185). If the brain can be 
understood, then an understanding of how the mind operates will follow. The underlying 
assumption of this approach is that scientific inquiry will eventually lead to 
breakthroughs on how the mind operates.  
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 At this point, we will have to say that science may be able to help us better 
understand the mind. However, can science account for all phenomenon inherent to the 
mind? This seems more difficult to answer. Our minds are so intertwined with who we 
are, yet their true nature seems to allude us whenever we try to study them. How could 
something so intimate to who we are feel so distant? This is what makes the Mind-Body 
problem so intriguing, yet so difficult to find an answer to.  
 In this paper, I will defend panpsychism as a solution to the mind-body problem. I 
will first present a history of the problem that highlights how the problem came about, 
along with a few proposed “solutions” to the problem. The focus of discussion will be 
Descartes’ substance dualism and various formulations of materialism that have been 
proposed as an answer to the problem. I will also mention several alternative solutions 
that have been proposed. I will then define what an adequate theory of mind will answer 
in its formulation. After this has been defined, I will propose panpsychism as a potential 
solution to the mind-body problem. This proposal will be accompanied with a defense of 
why this solution is stronger than the other solutions discussed. Finally, I will conclude 
with the potential implications that panpsychism brings to the mind-body problem. I do 
not hope to end discussion around the problem; in fact, my hope is that this proposal will 
help foster new discussion and scholarship on the subject.  
The History of the Mind-Body Problem 
 Before proposing a solution to the mind-body problem, we must first examine the 
history of the problem to understand where it came from. The history will also reveal 
previous solutions that have been tried, along with the criticisms those solutions have 
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endured through time. By engaging in such a review, we can focus on these potential 
criticisms and hope to account for them in our proposed theory.  
 While the Mind-Body problem itself did not come about until the work of Rene 
Descartes, ancient philosophers explored similar themes in their writings. This was 
especially apparent in the works of the Ancient Greeks, notably Plato and Aristotle. 
Understanding what these philosophers had to say about how humans think and feel is 
paramount to understanding what Descartes was responding to in his work.  
 There is an important clarification to make here: the Ancient Greeks did not use 
the concept of “Mind” like it is used in the Mind-Body problem today. In the place of 
minds, there was discussion of “soul” (psuche). In essence, the discussion for the Greeks 
centered around what the relationship between the body and the soul is. It is not difficult 
to see how this could be considered a forerunner to the Mind-Body problem.  
 In the Phaedo, Plato presents his most famous ideas on the relationship between 
the soul and the body. The Phaedo is a dramatized account of Socrates’ final hours before 
he is executed by the Athenians. Plato gives his own ideas on the soul within the dialogue 
by using the character Socrates as his mouthpiece. In the dialogue, Plato (through 
Socrates) argues that humans are embodied souls. This relationship between the human 
soul and the body is not “friendly:” Plato likens the body to a prison, as it is said to hold 
the soul hostage. Through various arguments, Plato attempts to show that the soul can 
survive after corporal death, achieving an immortality after bodily death (Frede 27). 
 Plato’s view suggests that humans are unique in that they are a sort-of “entrapped 
soul.” This body is nothing more than a restrictive vessel. The soul is ultimately what 
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makes humans capable of rational thought. The soul can only achieve the highest form of 
contemplation and thought when it is freed of the body. This freedom is achieved through 
bodily death. Thus, death could be seen as a good thing in the Platonic view. At the end 
of the Phaedo, Socrates hints he may actually be better off in the next life. Socrates 
drinks the hemlock and dies; Socrates is gone, but his body remains. Thus, we have the 
idea that the soul and the body are two distinct things.  
 After Plato comes another intellectual giant. As a student of Plato, Aristotle also 
has much to say on the relationship between souls and bodies. In his De Anima, he argues 
that the soul is a “form” that is within living bodies (Lorenz). The soul is not itself strictly 
the same thing as a body; however, for a body to be animated, Aristotle seems to imply 
that it must have a soul that allows it to function. This includes biological functions (in 
the case of plants and animals) and psychological/rational functions (in the case of 
humans). For Aristotle, the soul is “natural,” in the sense that it enables organisms to 
function in the natural world (Lorenz).  
 The soul for Aristotle is not trapped in the body; in fact, it is vital for the body to 
be alive. Due to its intimate relationship with the body, Aristotle seems to imply that the 
soul may not be able to survive unchanged after physical death (Lorenz). The soul is the 
“form” of the body; it gives the body the shape it takes. This implies that the soul and the 
body may be inseparable. Compare this to Plato, who viewed physical death as freeing 
the immortal soul from its Earthly bondage. Thus, in contrast to Plato, the soul for 
Aristotle is something that may not be able to exist independently of the body. The 
human is an intimate union between the soul and the body.  
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 These two theories from the Ancient Greeks are vastly influential in Western 
Philosophy. Not long after the Greeks, the early Christian Church started to gain 
followers around the world. One potential way to attract these earlier followers was to 
provide rational arguments as to why the teachings of the Church were true. If Christian 
doctrines such as Jesus’ resurrection could be shown to have to have a rational basis, then 
it would be easier for the growing Church to attract followers (Murray and Rea).  Ancient 
Greek philosophy could provide such rational support.   
 It is not difficult to see how this philosophy could be used for Christian purposes. 
Plato’s arguments for the immortality of the soul could be particularly useful in showing 
why there would be an afterlife such as Heaven or Hell. The soul would also survive 
bodily death because it goes to an afterlife. Aristotle’s idea that the soul somehow 
“animates” a body could be used to show how humans are special beings capable of 
rational thought. Also, later Christian Aristotelians like Thomas Aquinas used Aristotle’s 
view of the unified soul/body to argue for the necessity of a bodily resurrection (Van 
Dyke 374). Thus, these Greek ideas informed much of Christian thought, including up to 
the time Descartes. It is this viewpoint that Descartes largely responds to in his 
revolutionary works.  
Descartes and Substance Dualism 
 Rene Descartes (1596-1650) introduces the mind-body problem proper. From a 
young age, he was taught the Christian views regarding the relationship between the soul 
and the body, as he attended a Jesuit college (Grafton 38). At the same time, Descartes 
lived during the “Enlightenment” period in Europe, in which there was a newfound focus 
on rational inquiry and use of the scientific method. Thus, Descartes can be seen as a 
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“transition” figure: he knows of the traditional Christian understanding of the world, but 
also experiments with the new methodologies to better understand the natural world.  
 If the sciences could be used to understand the world, then they must rest on 
secure knowledge. Only if science is based on a secure foundation can our scientific 
findings be secure. If the foundational knowledge is false, then future findings will be 
false. In order to find this “secure foundation” for science to rest upon, Descartes must 
“raze everything to the ground” that he thought to be true (Descartes 9). By this, 
Descartes engages in his famous methodology, in which he rejects the existence of 
anything that can be doubted. Anything that can be doubted cannot be the “secure 
foundation” that Descartes is looking for.  
This methodological doubt is carried out in his Meditations on First Philosophy. 
In the first meditation, Descartes realizes that his senses could be doubted, as every 
experience that he believes he has could be a trick by what he calls an “evil genius” 
(Descartes 9). This evil genius could manipulate everything that he perceives in reality, 
including the fact that Descartes has a body. Thus, Descartes rejects his senses and 
experiences as accurate foundations for the sciences.  
Meditation One ends on this negative thought: if every experience can be 
doubted, how will Descartes ever get his secure foundation? The scientific method is 
based on empirical observation. If we cannot trust our own experiences, what can we 
trust? Descartes moves onto Mediation Two distraught but determined. It is here that 
Descartes has a genius, yet problematic thought: while he can be deceived that he has a 
body or experiences, he must first be in order to be deceived by the evil genius (Descartes 
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13). In other words, the fact that Descartes can be deceived means that he must first exist 
to be deceived. Descartes has found something that cannot be doubted.  
What does this finding imply? If Descartes’ own existence as a mind/thinking 
thing cannot be doubted but the body can, then the mind is not the same thing as a body 
for Descartes. In fact, they are two completely different things. Descartes holds a position 
that later philosophers termed “substance dualism.” For Descartes, reality divides into 
two different substances: physical substance and mental substance (Searle 9). This 
corresponds to what can be called “body” and “mind.” What makes something a kind of 
substance is that it has an essence that no other kind of substance possesses (Searle 9). 
The essence for body is extension, which is that bodies are extended in physical space. In 
contrast, the essence of mind is that it is thinking. “Thinking” is a broad term for 
Descartes: it includes such phenomena as conceiving, imagining, desiring, sensing, etc. 
From these two essences, we can infer that bodies/physical matter cannot think, and 
minds cannot be extended in space (Searle 9). Mind is thinking substance and nothing 
else, and body is extended substance and nothing else.  
Humans can be said to consist of both substances for Descartes. While the “I” for 
Descartes is identified with the mind rather than the body, the physical body still has 
some connection to the mind. Here is the crux of the mind-body problem: if humans 
consist of both a physical substance in space and a mental substance not within space, 
how would the two substances interact?  In other words, at what point does the mind meet 
the body? Descartes conceives of these as two distinct substances: the mind in no way 
“emerges” from the properties of the body. Despite this proposed distinction, humans still 
seem to be able to use their mind to cause changes in their body (e.g. thinking about 
11 
 
lifting your arm, and then subsequently raising it). Likewise, changes in the body seem to 
be able to cause changes in the mind (e.g. taking medicine to dull the feelings of pain 
within your mind). If humans have this sort of interaction between the mind and the 
body, then Descartes must give an account as to how this interaction occurs.  
Descartes’ answer to this problem reflects the difficulties that plague the mind-
body problem to this day. While Descartes was alive, many contemporaries questioned 
the implications of his theories. Among these contemporaries was Princess Elizabeth of 
Bohemia (1618-1680). In her correspondence with Descartes, Elizabeth asked how an 
immaterial substance like the mind could cause changes in a casually-closed, material 
universe (Schmaltz 283). By causally-closed, I mean a universe in which every event has 
a physical cause. Such a universe does not rule out the possibility that events also have 
mental causes. However, it would rule out Descartes’ claim that mental states, on their 
own, can produce a physical change. If the mind is distinct from the body as Descartes 
suggests, and doesn’t even have extension, then it is difficult to see how it could cause 
such physical changes. Descartes responded to Elizabeth by saying of the mind, “…it is 
united to the body and can act and be acted upon along with it” (Hoffman 342). Despite 
the distinction between substances, they are indeed somehow united in such a way to 
allow for this interaction.  
If the mind and the body are united, then there must be a point at which this 
unification occurs. Descartes’ “unity” answer to Elizabeth is mysterious; Descartes’ 
attempts to explain this unity are even more so. Descartes never gives Elizabeth a straight 
answer to her question. When pressured on the same point by others, Descartes at one 
point suggests that this point of interaction is the pineal gland within the brain. The pineal 
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gland is the “seat of the rational soul,” with it being the point in space where interaction 
with the immaterial mind occurs (Lokhurst sec. 2.1). At the time, Descartes believed 
(falsely) that the pineal gland was the point where all nerves in the body terminated 
(Lokhurst sec. 2.3). Since all nerves supposedly terminated there, it seemed to be the best 
spot in the body to suggest that the soul interacts with. The immaterial soul could move 
the physical body by routing through the nerves. The pineal gland was found to not be as 
important even during Descartes’ time. It does not disprove his theory, but it certainly 
does not help it. Thus, we are left with a tentative answer that the pineal gland is the 
keystone for mind-body interaction.  
Does this conclusion seem difficult to accept? It was even for Descartes. 
Throughout his scholarly life, Descartes struggled to adequately explain just how the 
mind and body interacted; he would often redirect questions about this subject when it 
was posed to him (Lokhurst sec. 2.4). It is his failure to provide a good answer that gives 
us the mind-body problem. Because we are left with this fundamental discrepancy 
between the mind and body, substance dualism appears to be a failure as an adequate 
theory of mind.  
Property Dualism 
Even if substance dualism fails, perhaps there is another form of dualism that may 
be able to avoid some of the problems of substance dualism. In contrast to substance 
dualism, there is a theory known as “property dualism.” This view holds that rather than 
there being two distinct substances, there is in fact only one kind of substance, that being 
physical substance (Zimmerman 120). The “dualism” of this view comes from the 
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properties of this physical substance. There are still the normal properties that one would 
expect out of purely physical matter (extension, mass, etc.). In addition to these 
properties, certain instances of physical substance will also exhibit mental properties 
(Yang 3212). Mental properties are not identical with physical properties; despite this, 
they still must be included as essential features in a physical universe (Yang 3212).  
Does property dualism present an adequate account of mind? The evidence is 
shaky. One problem with property dualism is that it seems to be difficult to determine just 
where the mental properties arise in a physical universe. Many proponents of property 
dualism hold the brain to be the physical area that exhibits both physical and mental 
properties (Zimmerman 120). This view leads to a problem: what qualities must a 
physical substance have in order to exhibit the mental properties? The property dualist 
must explain just why it is that physical objects as brains can have mental properties but 
other physical things such as a block of wood cannot. It seems that it would be difficult to 
determine where the line is for mental properties to be present, compared to instances of 
physical matter where they are not present.  
An example can help illustrate this. Upon observation, it does not seem to be a 
stretch to say that dogs exhibit some sort of mental properties. We cannot observe their 
mental life, but the properties seem to be reflected in their behavior. Dogs seem to be 
familiar and comfortable around their owners. They behave accordingly. In order for 
them to have this familiarity, it would seem to be the case that they must have some 
capacity for conscious memory. They seem to be able to remember particular scents, 
what their owners look like, etc. These experiences have a particular “what it’s like to be 
a dog” aspect attached to themselves. I would argue that these “dog experiences” would 
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qualify as mental properties. Dogs therefore exhibit mental properties that the property 
dualist would say comes from their brains.  
What happens when we go to more simple organisms? It seems counterintuitive to 
suppose that mental properties will appear only at a certain point of complexity in a 
being’s brain. Where would this point of complexity exactly be at? The property dualist 
could say that only human brains are capable of expressing mental properties, but this 
would be denying the experiences of more complex animals. The property dualist could 
also draw the line at some specific point in the chain of being, but any specific point 
seems to be arbitrary without an adequate argument to justify it. This does not kill 
property dualism as an argument, but it makes it more mysterious to those that the 
property dualist hopes to persuade.  
 Property dualism also runs into another big problem. Is it any better off for 
accounting for interaction than substance dualism? Even if the mental side of reality 
interacts with the brain as a property, this interaction is still just as mysterious as 
substance dualism. Why should one adopt property dualism over substance dualism if it 
is still just as mysterious? If the property dualist wants to argue that this theory is the 
better version of dualism, they will need to show why the interaction is less mysterious 
between properties within physical substance compared to between substances.  
Epiphenomenalism 
Attempts have been made to accomplish this task, but the arguments are still 
lacking. The variant of property dualism that I described above is also commonly 
associated with another view called epiphenomenalism. With epiphenomenalism, mental 
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events (such as thinking, feeling, desiring, etc.) can be caused by physical causes, but 
they themselves cannot cause physical events (Popper 183). Mental properties in this 
view are something different than physical matter, but they themselves have no causal 
power in the universe. The universe is here causally-closed, with only physical events 
being able to cause anything. Thus, mental properties are nothing more than a by-product 
from physical processes.  
For the epiphenomenalist, any appearance that mental properties or states can 
have a causal role in the physical universe is simply an illusion. This is a step further than 
property dualism; the property dualist will still say that mental properties will somehow 
play a causal role in the universe, no matter how mysterious that role may be. The 
epiphenomenalist view of the universe simply writes off subjective mental experience as 
just a useless aftereffect, which has no impact on the world or even on other mental 
states. Does this seem right to say? Again, shaky at best. At this point, why even say that 
there is a non-physical by-product of physical structures that plays no causal role in the 
universe? Perhaps it would be easier to say that in reality there is nothing above and 
beyond the physical.  
The Move to Materialism 
With the problems associated with substance dualism, the next logical step is to 
move away from suggesting that there are two substances, but rather that there is only 
one. Monism (a theory that there is only one kind of substance in reality) may better 
explain the mind-body problem. In keeping with the trend of reducing the role of the 
mental side of reality, why not go one step further and eliminate this role completely? 
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Why not eliminate mental properties? Materialism is the view that everything in reality is 
composed of physical substance and that mental states are really nothing but physical 
states (Searle 34). If something exists, it must be a physical substance and nothing else. 
Likewise, any property which a thing has is reducible to a physical property. 
Materialism has had many proponents in one way or another throughout the 
history of philosophy. In Ancient Greece, philosophers such as Democritus and 
Leucippus argued for an atomic theory of the universe in which everything is somehow 
composed of physical atoms in a vacuum called the “void” (Berryman sec. 2). The void is 
taken here to be the absence of atoms, or nothing more than the space in which the atoms 
reside in (Berryman sec. 2). It is not important here to explain the details of Ancient 
atomism; the point here is that materialism had proponents even near the beginning of 
recorded philosophy.  
Support for materialism continued to the time of Descartes. Thomas Hobbes 
(1588 – 1679), English philosopher and contemporary of Descartes, argued for a version 
of materialism. While it is not important to capture the specific details of the theory, it is 
important to note that this theory lays the foundation for future materialists to develop the 
theory from. At one point in his magnum opus Leviathan, Hobbes gives a basic statement 
of his materialism: “The world, (I mean not the earth only, that denominates the lovers of 
it worldly men, but the universe, that is, the whole mass of all things that are) is 
corporeal, that is to say, body; and hath the dimensions of magnitude, namely, length, 
breadth, and depth: also every part of body, is likewise body, and hath the like 
dimensions; and consequently every part of the universe, is body, and that which is not 
body, is no part of the universe: and because the universe is all, that which is no part of it, 
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is nothing; and consequently nowhere” (Leviathan Ch. 46, par. 15). In essence, Hobbes 
here says that everything in reality is body (or material). Talk about such things as 
“incorporeal substances” or something outside of the material universe is for Hobbes 
ridiculous; everything must in some way be composed of matter.  
Identity Theory 
Materialism was present during the time of Descartes, but support for it has 
continued to contemporary times. During the 20th century, many materialists adopted a 
view that is often called the Mind/Brain Identity Theory. This view holds that the mind 
is, strictly speaking, identical with the brain (Smart 56). Reports of the mind and mental 
processes are in fact reports of the brain and brain processes. While we may speak of the 
mind as being something different than the brain, if we really investigate the nature of the 
mind we will ultimately find that it is just brain processes at work.  
When we say such a phrase as “I am in pain,” the identity theorist thinks that we 
are in fact reporting a particular brain state that we are in. This sensation is nothing above 
and beyond the physical brain process; to suppose otherwise is for the identity theorist to 
posit something non-physical. The statement itself is not a brain process, but it is the 
report of a brain process (Smart 56). Everything classified as “mental” is thus a process 
that in the end is “physical.” The identity theorist thus has their own account of “mind” 
and “body.”  
If the identity theory is correct, then materialism seems to have provided a 
complete account of both mind and body. Identity theory is especially attractive because 
of the positive consequences the theory gives if it is indeed true. For one, the mind is 
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ultimately just brain processes, and thus observable. This means that the mind can be 
explained by scientific inquiry. This is very attractive, particularly today when there is 
such a push to understand the universe through the use of science. The mind would be 
one more part of the universe that science will ultimately learn everything about. Also, 
the reduction to only physical “stuff” and its properties in the universe allows for a 
parsimony in one’s theory that is not found in substance or property dualism. Materialism 
thus seems to be a simpler way of explaining the universe.  
Have we found a complete answer to the mind-body problem? While it may seem 
like this is an adequate explanation for some, something seems off with identity theory. If 
dualism cannot escape without criticism, the same can be said about identity theory. Does 
it really seem like a phrase such as “I feel happy” could be translated into such a phrase 
as “I am in brain-state #29743?” In other words, does it seem human thinking, desiring, 
emotion, etc. is simply nothing but processes in the brain? Perhaps there are actually 
some facts of existence that cannot be reduced to brain processes. If this is the case, 
identity theory falls apart.  
Identity theory is also too restrictive in what it allows as mental states. If identity 
theory, by definition, states that mental states are brain states, then only beings that have 
brains like humans could ever be said to have mental states. Other beings, such as insects, 
could not have mental states, since they lack the brain that a human would have. Despite 
this, insects seem to exhibit behavior that suggests mental function in some sense: for 
example, bees gather materials for their hives from plants. In order to distinguish a plant 
from a predator, they must have some way to sense or perceive the difference between 
things, like a flower compared to a frog. Wouldn’t this capacity to distinguish be some 
19 
 
sort of mental state for the bee? By the identity theorist’s account, bees cannot have such 
mental states since they do not have the brain states of humans. At best, other beings 
could only operate through involuntary processes that require no mental states (akin to 
your heart beating, whether you want it to or not).  
Functionalism 
This problem with identity theory seemed too difficult to explain for many 
identity theorists. How could they say that every other being in nature has no mental 
states whatsoever? Perhaps mental states are multiple realizable, in that they can come 
about from more than one physical structure in nature. To account for multiple 
realizability, many identity theorists modified the theory to allow for it. In the process, a 
new theory called functionalism emerged from this modification. Functionalism redefines 
what a mental state is: instead of strictly being identical with a brain process, mental 
states are functional in relation to the behavior within a particular organism (Searle 43). 
In other words, mental states are causally related to the external stimuli and behaviors. 
For example, a person may perceive that there is a glass of water sitting on a table. The 
external stimuli (the glass) causes a mental state of the desire to drink the water. This 
mental state, in conjunction with one’s beliefs and other mental states, then causes the 
person to exhibit the behavior of picking up and drinking the water. Mental states thus 
serve as functions between stimuli and behavior.  
Functionalism, when applied to the brain, sees the brain as a sort-of computer. 
The brain is the hardware of the computer itself, in that it is composed of nothing but 
physical matter. When the brain receives external stimuli (connected causally) this could 
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be like someone typing on the keyboard of the computer. This stimuli, in turn, will 
eventually lead to a program on the computer (or software). The software are the mental 
states, which are functional. Functionalism seems to lead to multiple realizability, as it 
suggests the idea that mental states could be realized in multiple different systems. For 
the functionalist, a complex-enough computer could, in fact, be said to exhibit mental 
states due to the causal connections they have with the stimuli in the physical system.   
Criticisms of Functionalism and Materialism 
While it may solve the problem of multiple realizability that identity theory could 
not, functionalism does have problems of its own. Just what counts as a “system” in 
which mental states can be potentially realized? In a critique of functionalism, Ned Block 
presents an argument that is known as the “China Brain” argument. Block asks what 
would happen if the whole nation of China organized itself in such a way as to mimic a 
human brain (Block 279). Each person in China could function as an individual neuron 
within the “brain.” Now here is functionalism applied to the scenario: as long as each 
person within the nation brain system performed their assigned functional role, the 
functionalist may have to say that mental states could be realized by the collective 
Chinese system. If it is the same system as a brain (only on a larger scale), then mental 
states or even a substantial mind should come about from the functional organization. In 
contrast to saying this, Block argues that this is absurd; there would not be anything close 
to a “mind” form within the Chinese system. Block concludes that the functionalist idea 
of “multiple realizability” seems arbitrary, in that we are unable to determine what can 
count as a “mind” under functionalism.  
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What are we to think of functionalism? It seems to be a clear improvement over 
identity theory, since it does allow for multiple realizability. On the other hand, the 
multiple realizability that it purports to allow for seems to be problematic. We could say 
that Block’s Chinese nation would indeed be a realized mind under functionalism, but 
there is a reluctance to admit this. What we take to be mental seems to have qualities that 
are specific to itself, rather than only coming about by being functional within a physical 
system. Functionalism would be adequate as a theory of mind if it could qualify itself in 
saying that only certain types of systems can allow for realizability. But there does not 
appear to be any criteria that can tell us why one system can realize mental states and 
another one can’t. Until such valid criteria are explained, functionalism will always seem 
flawed.  
While functionalism itself is lacking, there are several strong arguments against 
any position, whether functionalist or materialistic, which attempts to reduce first-person 
or subjective mental properties to something knowable from a third-person or objective 
perspective. In a classic criticism, philosopher Thomas Nagel presents an interesting 
example that highlights a major problem with these types of theories. Nagel asks the 
question, “What’s it like to be a bat?” This is an inquiry into the nature of the subjective 
consciousness that beings experience; in this case, Nagel asks what it is to be a bat. He 
states that for anything that could be said to have conscious experience, there must be 
something that it is like to be that thing (Nagel 436). Thus, if we are to say that bats have 
some sort of conscious experience, then we must say that there must be something that it 
is like to be a bat. Nagel here asks if we can account for the conscious experience of the 
bat.  
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The materialist and functionalist seem to think that we would be able to. It seems 
reasonable to say that bats do have some sort of experience, as they can do such complex 
things as navigate in caves with their faculties. One could deny that bats have 
experiences, but this seems like the more difficult point to argue; bats are mammals and 
seem to have similar behavior to other animals that we would say have experiences (like 
a dog). If the materialist does admit that bats have experiences, then these experiences 
must somehow be shown to be nothing above and beyond physical substance. If the 
functionalist admits it, then these experiences must somehow be shown to be nothing 
above and beyond what a bat does. On both theories these experiences are completely 
within the realm of scientific observation. Thus, we as humans should be able to provide 
a complete account of the bat’s experiences.  
What happens when we try to do this? So far, science has shown that even though 
bats have eyes, they have little use for vision, at least the kind we are used to. Bats, 
particularly if they live in caves, navigate through some form of echolocation, in which 
their advanced hearing allows them to fly from place to place. While we as humans can 
examine the bats’ faculties and determine that they navigate using echolocation, can we 
in fact really experience what echolocation is like for the bat? It seems to be that only 
bats have access to this experience, and we are in fact closed off from the consciousness 
of the bat. The experience of the bat is not translatable into the objective, scientific 
language that the materialist or functionalist wants to say can account for the entire 
universe. But for these theories, it is impossible for echolocation to be anything other 
than a process describable in objective, scientific language.  
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Another famous example adds to this criticism. In “What Mary Didn’t Know,” 
Frank Jackson presents the interesting fictional case of Mary. Mary is confined to a room 
from birth to adulthood. What is peculiar about the room is that everything in there is 
black and white, including Mary. Furthermore, Mary is fed by black and white nutrition, 
reads black and white books, and has a black and white TV. There are no windows for 
her to look out of. Thus, Mary experiences only things in black and white from birth 
(Jackson 291).  
What does Mary do to occupy her time? She decides to become sort-of a scientist, 
in that she invests her time to learn every physical fact about the universe through books 
and lectures on the television. Jackson uses physical in a complete sense, in that he refers 
to Mary learning everything in physics, chemistry, and biology, along with the causal 
roles between everything (Jackson 291). Thus, Mary could be said to have a complete 
knowledge of the material universe, which for the materialist is everything in existence. 
This would include Mary understanding everything there is to know about color, as she 
must have studied how colors are perceived by the eye during her time in the room.  
Now here is the twist in Jackson’s scenario: suppose that Mary was able to escape 
the confines of the black and white room. Furthermore, suppose that the world outside of 
the room is completely “normal” as we would imagine it: the grass is green, the sky is 
blue. What would Mary experience outside of the room? If she knows every physical fact 
about the universe from her studies inside of the room, then coming outside of the room 
should not faze her. Upon seeing such things as the blue sky, she should not have a 
special reaction due to already studying why the sky is blue. She should not react to the 
green grass before her, as she already knows that grass is green due to the chlorophyll 
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found within the cells of the plant. Thus, under the materialist and functionalist views, 
Mary would be unfazed from her experiences of colors such as blue and green for the 
first time.  
Does this seem right? Again, we must doubt that physical facts can account for 
everything in the universe. It seems to be that Mary would learn something new by 
actually experiencing the colors she read about in her black and white textbooks. This 
subjective experience that Mary now has could not be learned within the confines of a 
room. Nor could it be experienced by merely knowing all the physical facts about the 
world. Thus, Jackson concludes that materialism and functionalism leave out substantial 
parts of the universe when they try to treat mental states as physical facts.  
From the above cases, we may reach a conclusion about materialism and 
functionalism. Both seem to leave out the subjective experiences of conscious beings in 
their accounts. Whether it be the experience of a bat or the experience of seeing a color 
for the first time, subjective facts must be acknowledged. These theories try to reduce 
them to physical facts by claiming that such experiences are in fact just processes in the 
brain, or functional system. But it is difficult to see how “I feel happy” is nothing above 
and beyond these processes. Perhaps science may eventually advance enough to show 
how subjective experiences are really nothing but these processes. Until then, these 
philosophers must provide a separate account of how these subjective experiences can be 
equated with physical facts. To admit that they are not physical is to adopt a position at 
odds with both functionalism and the identity theory.  
 
25 
 
Spinoza and Panpsychism 
At this point, let’s review what we have discovered so far. First, it is clear from 
our earlier analysis that problems arise when we view ourselves as composed of two 
completely different substances. It is impossible to determine how a non-physical mind 
and a physical body could interact, and at what point this interaction would occur. The 
problem remains when we switch to property dualism and ask how the mental properties 
and physical properties of a material thing could interact. At the same time, we cannot 
simply reduce everything that is considered mental into nothing but the physical 
properties of physical things. Nor can we reduce them merely as functional states. Thus, 
in order for the Mind-Body problem to be solved, we must find a theory that allows for 
mental states that exist over and above the body and its processes and behavior. 
Furthermore, mentality cannot be in the universe at specific points for seemingly 
arbitrary reasons; mentality cannot just suddenly “be there” when a physical system 
reaches a certain level of complexity. Finally, we must still recognize that the universe 
does have physical “stuff” within it; we cannot say that matter is an illusion. Scientific 
inquiry into the natural universe is still valid and provides us with information about how 
the universe operates. Thus, we must also recognize the physical side of reality.  
Is there a theory that is able to meet these criteria? The picture becomes bleaker 
after each theory is found to be flawed. However, I have by no means provided an 
exhaustive list of the theories that have been tried. Versions of dualism and materialism 
have historically been the dominant views in regard to the Mind-Body problem, but they 
are not the only ones. In fact, dualism and materialism seem to have the most problems 
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associated with them. Out of all the theories that have not been reviewed yet, one seems 
to meet the criteria that we have set for an adequate theory of mind. This is panpsychism.  
Panpsychism is not a new theory. When we try to find a proponent of the theory, 
we can go to shortly after the time of Descartes. Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) was a 
Jewish-Dutch philosopher living in the Netherlands. While renowned for his philosophy 
today, Spinoza worked as a lens grinder to earn a living. Spinoza presents his own theory 
of mind within his Ethics. The Ethics follows the pattern of Euclid’s Elements, in that 
Spinoza begins with basic axioms from which he derives further ideas through logic. The 
theory of mind that follows is in stark contrast to both Descartes and any form of 
materialism.  
In the Ethics, Spinoza argues that there is in fact only one substance (using the 
Cartesian terminology). This substance, for Spinoza, is known as God or Nature (Part I, 
Prop. 14). For Spinoza, all things ultimately are caused by and exist in the one substance. 
This is because of the divine nature of the one substance; everything must necessarily 
exist as a modification or mode of this substance, since for Spinoza the substance is the 
one and only reality (Part I, Prop. 16). Furthermore, this substance has infinite attributes, 
which are ways in which a substance has its “essence” (Def. 4). Since God is the only 
substance and is infinite, God has infinite attributes and each of its parts or modes is 
expressed through infinite attributes. Despite having these infinite attributes, Spinoza 
argues that humans are only capable of understanding two: extension and thought.  
Sound familiar? Thought and extension are what Descartes believed were the 
essences of his two substances. The difference here is that instead of there being two 
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distinct substances, Spinoza argues that there is in fact only one eternal substance. Since 
thought and extension are attributes of one underlying system, and not distinct 
substances, our whole perspective changes on the issue of Mind-Body interaction. 
Furthermore, Spinoza’s system solves many of the problems that plague both dualism 
and materialism.  
Each attribute is one of an infinite number of ways that the one substance 
manifests itself. As mentioned, humans are only capable of understanding the attributes 
of thought and extension. For any given object in nature or mode of the one substance, 
we are able to comprehend it both as a physical thing in nature and as an idea within 
thought. To illustrate this, Spinoza states, “…a circle existing in Nature and the idea of 
the existing circle – which is also God – are one and the same thing, explicated through 
different attributes. And so, whether we conceive Nature under the attribute of Extension 
or under the attribute of Thought or under any other attribute, we find one in the same 
order, or one in the same connection of causes…” (Part II, Prop. 7, Scholium). We can 
thus comprehend anything in reality under the attribute of extension or the attribute of 
thought; what is important here is to realize that for Spinoza, they are not two distinct 
things, but two ways of viewing the same thing. In this way, thought and extension are 
two sides of the same coin: simply flip over the coin to see a different perspective of the 
same thing.  
What happens when we take this metaphysical theory and apply it to ourselves as 
humans? If there is only one substance, and we are not outside of reality but merely a part 
or modification of that one substance, then we do not escape the things that Spinoza 
believes logically flow from the one substance. As mentioned earlier, humans seem to 
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have what we would call a mind and a body. For Spinoza, these are two different 
attributes of the one eternal substance. Humans understand the universe (and themselves) 
through these attributes. When we talk about our body or physical states, we are 
comprehending one part of the universe through extension and its properties, and when 
we talk about our mind and its mental states we are comprehending the same part of the 
universe through thought and its properties. We are thus left with two different ways of 
comprehending one and the same mode of substance.  
It seems to be clear how Spinoza’s panpsychist theory purports to “solve” the 
mind-body problem. Technically speaking, the mind-body problem does not even arise 
within this view (Nadler sec. 2.2). Within Spinoza’s system, the attributes of thought and 
extension cannot interact within one another at any point in the causal chain. The 
description of the modes of God conceived as physical is conceptually independent from 
the description of those same modes conceived as mental. Causes between extended 
things and the human body are one way the infinite substance manifests itself, while the 
causal chain of thought into minds are another way. For Spinoza, each attribute cannot 
cross into the other; ideas do not flow from extension, nor do bodies flow from the 
attribute of thought. Thus, Spinoza’s theory also entails parallelism, which is the thesis 
that each thing in the universe can be seen as both a mode in the attribute of thought and 
a mode in the attribute of extension. However, each attribute cannot affect the other, as 
attributes are distinct from each other. The mind-body problem does not arise because of 
this parallelism between the modes in each attribute.  
If Spinoza is right, then the mind-body problem has indeed been solved. 
Interaction does not need to be explained, because it cannot occur due to the attributes 
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being causally distinct from one another. Furthermore, both aspects of being human are 
accounted for in the theory: bodies are accounted for through the attribute of extension, 
and minds are accounted for through the attribute of thought. Thus, panpsychism 
provides a theory that accounts for both aspects of being human, yet does so by not 
adding a new substance to account for mind. Perhaps we have finally found a theory that 
achieves everything that an adequate theory of mind should.  
Criticisms of Panpsychism and Answers 
 Since panpsychism seems to solve the mind-body problem, one would expect that 
it would be a widely-held view today. As expected in philosophy, it is not. Despite its 
ability to solve these problems of mind, panpsychism, like any other theory, does not 
escape criticism. However, while the criticisms of panpsychism are fair, they ultimately 
are easier to answer than the problems that both dualism and materialism face. While it 
will never be a perfect theory, panpsychism will ultimately appear the strongest position 
of mind once these criticisms are answered. Accordingly, I will provide some potential 
criticisms and subsequently answer them.  
 First, the critic may notice what the parallelism within Spinoza’s argument really 
entails: if each attribute is separate from any other and in no way interacts, then how can 
we explain why humans seem to have mind-body interaction? In other words, why does 
the mind appear to be aware of what goes on in the body, even if it cannot in any way 
affect the body? This mystery can be answered when we really pay attention to what 
Spinoza means when he talks about the attributes. For the body, it is subject to a chain of 
causes that are modes of the attribute of extension. The human body can only be acted on 
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by other physical, extended things. With each link in the causal chain, there is a 
corresponding mental cause upon the mind. That is why if you were to be hit with 
something and you felt pain in your arm, you would have the ability to think about the 
event that just occurred. There is ultimately one event that occurs, and only one chain of 
causes that affect it, but each thing in reality can be conceived under both attributes. So, 
for the human being, the perception that we are both a mind and a body that can interact 
with one another is just a confusion in which we take one event with two aspects to be 
two really distinct events instead.  
 Panpsychism is often criticized for being “too strange” of a theory to accept. In 
contemporary times, the general trend for intellectuals is to suppose that materialism is 
true, even if we lack the scientific evidence to completely validate it at this time. 
Materialism must be true, and science will eventually progress enough to confirm this. 
For many, panpsychism is contrary to this basic assumption that the universe is 
completely material: not only does panpsychism posit something other than the material, 
but by definition it suggests that all reality is also mental. Such a view is too strange to 
have any weight in today’s intellectual debates.  
 Admittedly, panpsychism is a strange view. It is not conventional, and support for 
it has been significantly less than the dominant theories over the years. However, is it any 
stranger than both dualism and materialism? Dualism is strange because it tries to “add” a 
non-physical substance to reality that does not seem conducive for it. There is no reason 
as to why mind is present at certain points in reality and not at others. Conversely, 
panpsychism does not add this non-physical mind at specific points in space; rather, mind 
is everywhere in reality. There is no need to explain why mind is at specific locations in 
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space. Materialism is strange because it tries to package all mental phenomena into one 
physical package. Mental phenomena are more complex than this. Panpsychism does not 
try this, as it holds that mind is from a separate attribute than material, extended things. 
Thus, panpsychism is no stranger than the other theories that try to account for mind.  
 Finally, panpsychism is often criticized for supposing that everything in reality 
has a mind. This would include such things as rocks, the sun, subatomic particles, a 
bacterium, etc. Each of these things are thought to have a mind that is capable of 
thinking, feeling, and desiring. Panpsychism could be taken this far, but such a view 
would be hard to defend due to the implausibility of the position. Fortunately, such a 
position need not be the case for panpsychism. Instead, we can say that every mode 
(thing) in reality could have differing levels of the mentality that flows from the attribute 
of thought. Whereas humans possess a complex mind, further down the chain, such 
things as rocks and subatomic particles have only a minimal level of mentality. Since 
they are real modes of extension, it is necessary that they have some level of mentality, 
but this mentality could be present only at a minimum level. Such things do not need 
minds like ours in order to exist; only the most fleeing and vague mentality must be 
present.  
Conclusion 
 Obviously, this analysis of the mind-body problem and the theories that have been 
posited to solve it is by no means complete. One could write several volumes on the topic 
and still barely scratch the surface. It is doubtful that the problem will ever go away or be 
settled to the point that everyone is in agreement. Despite this, we continue to discuss 
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what it means to have a mind, and what it means to be human. Panpsychism offers the 
best account for why we have both a mind and a body. Of course, this is only what we 
have to work with now. There may be a theory in the future that provides an even fuller 
account of reality. Until then, panpsychism provides the fullest account of our 
physiology, thoughts, feelings, desires, and dreams.  
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